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THE VACCINE RACE IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Ana Santos Rutschman1
In a world in which infectious diseases are spreading increasingly faster, the development
of new human vaccines remains a priority in biopharmaceutical innovation. Legal scholars have
addressed different aspects of vaccine regulation and administration, but less attention has been
paid to the role of laws governing innovation during the stages of research and development
(R&D) of vaccines.
This Article explores the race to develop new vaccines from its beginnings through the
early 21st century, with a particular focus on the progressively pervasive role of intellectual
property in governing vaccine innovation. It describes the insufficiencies of current innovation
regimes in promoting socially desirable levels of vaccine R&D, particularly in the case of
emerging pathogens, a phenomenon that is at odds with public health needs.
Moreover, the Article identifies transactional inefficiencies affecting the licensure of
vaccine technology. In order to address this problem, the Article argues for adoption of a
technology-specific solution, and proposes a narrowly construed “take-and-pay” regime based
on liability rules, enabling access to vaccine technology by follow-on innovators.
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INTRODUCTION
Vaccines2 are among the most cost-effective ways of promoting public health.3 In addition
to preventing or lessening the impact of infectious diseases, 4 vaccines have been shown to
significantly decrease disability and inequity within health systems.5
Yet, and in spite of the increasing burden posed by infectious diseases in the U.S. and
abroad, the market for vaccines targeting emerging pathogens6 is often considered unprofitable.7
Globally, very few private companies are currently engaged in vaccine research and development
(R&D),8 and the public sector lacks the capacity to fully develop and manufacture new vaccines

2

The World Health Organization defines vaccines as “a biological preparation that improves immunity to a
particular disease. A vaccine typically contains an agent that resembles a disease-causing microorganism, and is
often made from weakened or killed forms of the microbe, its toxins or one of its surface proteins. The agent
stimulates the body’s immune system to recognize the agent as foreign, destroy it, and ‘remember’ it, so that the
immune system can more easily recognize and destroy any of these microorganisms that it later encounters.”
WORLD HEALTH ORG., VACCINES, http://www.who.int/topics/vaccines/en/.
3

See e.g. Vanessa Rémy et al., Vaccination: The Cornerstone of an Efficient Healthcare System, 3 JOURNAL MARK.
ACCESS HEALTH POLICY 27041 (2015) (estimating that, over time, the diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis (DTP)
vaccine has saved the U.S. health system $23.6 billion).
4

The Article focuses on vaccines targeting infectious diseases, which form the bulk of diseases for which there are
either approved vaccines or ongoing vaccine R&D. Examples of this type of disease include influenza, whooping
cough, measles and HIV/AIDS. See Stanley A. Plotkin et al., Establishing a Global Vaccine-Development Fund,
NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 297, 298 (Jul. 23, 2015) (listing vaccine-preventable diseases). Additional categories of
ongoing vaccine R&D tend to rely on technology that is not yet fully developed, and consequently there is little to
no information about the underlying economics and market configuration for those vaccines. For instance, no DNA
vaccines have been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration or by any other regulatory entity in the
world. Similarly, technology currently used in the development of cancer vaccine candidates is still in its infancy
(the currently available human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine is considered by many scientists to be a simpler type
of vaccine technology than cancer vaccines proper). See also generally Chunqing Guo et al., Therapeutic Cancer
Vaccines: Past, Present and Future, 119 ADV. CANCER RES. 421 (2013) (summarizing R&D on therapeutic cancer
vaccines); Lei Li et al., The Future of Human DNA Vaccines, 162 J. BIOTECHNOL. 171 (2013) (summarizing R&D
on DNA vaccines).
5

See generally F. E. André et al., Vaccination Greatly Reduces Disease, Disability, Death and Inequity Worldwide,
86 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 140 (2008).
6

The Article further zeroes in on vaccines targeting neglected diseases, such as infectious diseases in the Zika and
Ebola families, as well as vaccines targeting known pathogens for which no vaccine has entered the market, such as
cytomegalovirus. See infra, notes 156 and 223 and accompanying text.
7

See infra, note 212.

8

See infra, note 87 and accompanying text.
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on its own.9 Over time, the rates of new or innovative vaccines10 entering the market have sharply
declined.11
Market forces are at odds with the public health need to promote innovative vaccine R&D,
and the consequences of the current underinvestment in vaccine innovation may prove dire.12 This
paradox has long been recognized. 13 But so far it has not been comprehensively analyzed in
connection with the legal regimes designed to foster R&D, facilitate transfers of technology among
innovators and disseminate innovative goods. This Article fills that gap, identifying a disconnect
between the reliance on proprietary rights as the default mechanism to incentivize technical
innovation and the specific characteristics of vaccine R&D. In order to address this disconnect, the
Article argues that legal interventions are needed to curb the overly proprietary contours of the
regimes governing vaccine R&D in the U.S.,14 without eliminating patent-driven models of
vaccine R&D competition.
The Article looks at the evolution of vaccine technologies15 through the progression of
vaccine R&D in a race-like format through time. The initial race(s) to develop vaccines took place
in lightly regulated environments that posed minimal constraints to innovative practices.16
Together with a series of scientific breakthroughs and a spike in funding for vaccine R&D, the 20th
century ushered in a golden age of vaccine innovation.17 This boom in vaccine R&D resulted in
the development of multiple vaccines which have contributed to reducing mortality and managing
morbidity caused by a broad range of infectious diseases. 18 Examples include meningitis, hepatitis

9

See infra, note 166 and accompanying text.

10

The Article uses the concept of innovation in a broad sense, and without attempting to provide formal metrics to
measure innovation (or inventive levels) in the field of vaccine R&D. Rather, the Article looks at innovation from
the perspective of continued and follow-on activity leading to the discovery, production and commercialization of
new vaccine technologies. As seen in Part II, the development or availability of a new vaccine or vaccine technology
might not represent a true leap forward in scientific terms, and as such an increase in number of approved vaccines
might not directly correlate with an increase in vaccine innovation from a scientific perspective. It should be noted
that assessing innovation in the field of vaccine R&D presents particular difficulties. Data from the 20th century on
vaccine R&D is incomplete and fragmented. Regulatory data on vaccine approvals is often unreliable, and
sometimes plainly inaccurate. See e.g. HOYT, infra note 75. Nevertheless, even imperfect data can be used as a
general proxy to identify industry and market trends in vaccine development, manufacturing and commercialization.
11

Infra, Part I.B.

12

See e.g. Julia Belluz, 4 Reasons Disease Outbreaks Are Erupting Around the World, VOX (May 31, 2016),
https://www.vox.com/ 2016/5/31/11638796/why-there-are-more-infectious-disease-outbreaks (noting that the
numbers of outbreaks attributable to infectious diseases has been on the rise).
13

See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, A REVIEW OF SELECTED FEDERAL VACCINE AND
IMMUNIZATION POLICIES, BASED ON CASE STUDIES OF PNEUMOCOCCAL VACCINE [hereinafter OTA Report], (1979).
14

See FINANCING VACCINES IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ASSURING ACCESS AND AVAILABILITY (hereinafter FINANCING
VACCINES), National Academies Press (2003), at 116 (noting that vaccines developed in the U.S. have contributed
to as much as two thirds of global vaccine innovation in recent decades).
15

By “vaccine technology” this Article refers to any components and processes used in the development,
manufacturing and delivery of vaccines. Examples include proteins and atomizers (nasal sprays).
16

Infra, Part I.A.

17

Infra, Part I.B.

18

Id.

3

DRAFT (please direct comments to ana.rutschman@slu.edu)
Forthcoming in Arizona L. Rev 61:4
B, influenza, tuberculosis, measles, mumps and rubella—diseases against which patient
populations in the U.S. are now routinely vaccinated.19
As progressively stricter regulatory frameworks for vaccine R&D and administration were
imposed, vaccine manufacturers began exiting the market.20 Manufacturer attrition
chronologically overlaps with a decrease in the number of vaccines entering the market in the
second half of the 20th century. This coincides with the period in which the race to produce new
vaccines also became a race to patent vaccine technology, although the Article does not claim a
correlation between the two phenomena.21
In the 21st century, increasingly larger public-private partnerships operating in the vaccine
R&D space have sought to counter the prevailing market forces and finance expenditures in
vaccine technologies. While subscribing to the view that the rise of public-private partnerships is
contributing to the promotion of vaccine R&D, the Article notes that this trend alone is unlikely to
introduce the necessary systemic reforms needed to address the vaccine development paradox. It
suggests, however, that collaborative approaches like the ones embodied by these partnerships
might point the way towards more collaborative approaches to vaccine development.22
In addition to problems pertaining to R&D incentives, the Article identifies at least one
instance in which reliance on the patent system as the default mechanism to incentivize vaccine
innovation has resulted in inefficient transactional practices between vaccine manufacturers.
Through a short case study on the cytomegalovirus vaccine,23 the Article illustrates the problem
technology dispersion, which takes place when different patent-protected elements needed to make
a vaccine are scattered among non-cooperative firms.24 This practice, if replicated in other
contexts, can unnecessarily raise transaction costs and potentially delays or inhibits innovation.25
The Article argues that the problems posed by technology dispersion, together with the
severity of the lack of market incentives for vaccine innovation, justify the need for technologyspecific interventions.26 Specifically, it proposes and describes a framework for the creation of a
“take-and-pay” regime applicable solely to vaccine-related technologies (or subsets thereof)
covered by proprietary rights. Under such a regime, inspired by the use of liability rules,27 followon innovators wishing to use patent-protected vaccine technology for R&D purposes would not
have to bargain with the patent holder. Rather, they would pay the rights holder for the use of an
invention, according to a pre-established compensatory framework.28 This solution, which goes

19

See Stanley A. Plotkin et al., Establishing a Global Vaccine-Development Fund, supra note 4. See also
AMERICAN ASS’N PEDIATRICS, RED BOOK: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INFECTIOUS DISEASES, KIMBERLY ET AL.
(Eds.) (2015) (providing an authoritative discussion on vaccination and prevention of pediatric infectious diseases).
20

Infra, Part I.B.

21

Infra, Part I.C.

22

Id.

23

Infra, Part I.B.

24

Infra, Part III.A.

25

Interview with Dr. Stanley Plotkin, infra note 78.

26

Infra, Part III.B.

27

See infra, note 260 and accompanying text.

28

See infra, note 291 and accompanying text.
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against the traditional logics of proprietary rights, nonetheless preserves the original entitlement
of the patent holder,29 and is justified by broader social justice goals.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I traces the progression of the vaccine race through
time: initially, as a race against disease in an R&D environment where law and regulations played
little to no role; then, as a market-based race within an expanding legal architecture; and, finally,
as an idiosyncratic variant of the patent race. Part II focuses on the vaccine development paradox.
It explores the characteristics that make vaccine development unique, originating a “valley of
death” for vaccine R&D: a systemic inability to push vaccine technology through the R&D
pipeline and bring it to market. It then identifies transaction problems associated with vaccine
R&D, in the form of technology dispersion in a fragmented market. Part III argues that additional
solutions to promote vaccine R&D are still needed, and that they should be technology-specific,
such as the proposed adoption of a narrowly construed liability regime to foster follow-on
innovation in vaccine R&D. A brief conclusion follows.
I. THE RACE TO DEVELOP NEW VACCINES
The idea of vaccine R&D as a race is usually equated with competing efforts to develop
new vaccines throughout the 20th century.30 The apex of this race is often portrayed as the golden
age of the 1940-1960s, when the expansion of the biopharmaceutical industry in the U.S. and
interlinked scientific breakthroughs resulted in the development of numerous vaccines.31
However, these descriptive frameworks do not fully capture the ever-changing nature of
vaccine development. In particular, these accounts need to be supplemented from two angles. First,
from an innovation theory perspective, it is incomplete to look at vaccine R&D as a 20th-century
endeavor that has decayed into an unprofitable venture in the early 21st century. Rather, it has
always been heterogeneously characterized by evolving moving parts, which include shifting
institutional arrangements, varying market forces, and nuances in public health imperatives and
discourses. And second, from the viewpoint of law as a catalyst for innovation, different periods
of our race to develop new vaccines have been differently shaped by a plurality of factors. These
include legal incentives, regulatory frameworks, and interactions between collaborative
partnerships, as well as our notions of proprietary elements of science.
Bringing these components into legal scholarship focused on innovation regimes is
relevant, and not merely for historical or descriptive accuracy. As vaccine R&D plummets and
vaccine-preventable diseases increase their toll,32 understanding the many facets and variables of
vaccine races should inform our current policies and decision-making processes. To that effect,
Part I of the Article shows how the development of vaccines took the shape of a race at distinct
levels: first, as a race against pathogens in a largely unregulated environment; later, as a race to
overcome regulatory barriers to market; and, finally, as a patent-driven race.

29

“Entitlement” is used here in connection with legal theory scholarship on liability versus property rules, and
without speaking to the ongoing debate about the nature of patents. See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
30

See e.g. MEREDITH WADMAN, THE VACCINE RACE, VIKING (2017) (situating the vaccine race as a phenomenon
that took place in the mid- to late-20th century).
31

Infra, Part I.B.

32

Supra, note 12.
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A. THE FIRST VACCINE RACE
The first vaccine in history33 is usually credited to Edward Jenner, an 18th-century British
country doctor who took an interest in smallpox.34 Smallpox, a now-eradicated infectious disease,
is one of the most feared and lethal diseases in human history.35 It ravaged populations across the
globe for over three millennia, causing disfiguring skin lesions and killing an estimated 300 to 500
million people in the 20th century alone.36
In 1796, Jenner developed a rudimentary version of a smallpox vaccine37 by taking a
sample of an animal virus related to smallpox and introducing it into the system of a healthy eightyear old boy.38 This triggered an immune reaction, the first to be documented by scientific
parameters.39 It was the first step towards eradication of smallpox through vaccination, a goal that
would eventually be achieved in 1980.40
Jenner’s actions earned him a place in history as the inventor of the first vaccine. In reality,
however, Jenner did not actually invent vaccination.41 The theory that Jenner tested
experientially—that infection with an animal poxvirus triggered immunity to smallpox in

33

See Edward Jenner, An Inquiry into the Causes and Effects of the Variolae Vaccinae, A Disease Discovered in
Some of the Western Countries of England, Particularly Gloucestershire, and Known by the Name of The Cow Pox,
London (1798) (reporting what is commonly regarded as the first vaccination experiment in history). See also
Stanley Plotkin, History of Vaccination, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America, 12283, 12284 (2014) (listing Jenner’s smallpox vaccine as the first human vaccine).
34

See generally Andrea A. Rusnock, Historical Context and the Roots of Jenner’s Discovery, 12 HUMAN VACCINES
& IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 2025 (2016); E. Ashworth Underwood, Edward Jenner, Benjamin Waterhouse and the
Introduction of Vaccination into the United States, 163 NATURE 823 (1949). See also CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, SMALLPOX (describing the main characteristics of the variola virus, which causes smallpox),
https://www.cdc.gov/smallpox/index.html.
35

See D. A. HENDERSON, SMALLPOX: THE DEATH OF A DISEASE, PROMETHEUS (2009), at 19 (noting that “no disease
has killed so many hundreds of millions of people nor so frequently altered the course of history”). See generally
DONALD R. HOPKINS, THE GREATEST KILLER: SMALLPOX IN HISTORY, Chicago University Press (2002).
36

See Catherine Thèves et al., The Rediscovery of Smallpox, 20 CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY & INFECTION

210, 212 (2014) (noting that, although smallpox (variola major) had an average mortality of 30%, in cases of
hemorrhagic smallpox, mortality rates were higher than 97% in unvaccinated populations).
37

The term vaccine was coined a few years after Jenner’s experiment. See, e.g., Derrick Baxby, Edward Jenner’s
Inquiry After 200 Years, 318 THE BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 390 (1999).
38

See Jenner, An Inquiry, supra note 33.

39

Id. Jenner documented further experiments and submitted a systematic account of the results to the Royal Society
of London.
40

HENDERSON, SMALLPOX, supra note 35.

41

See Cary P. Gross & Kent A. Sepkowitz, The Myth of the Medical Breakthrough: Smallpox, Vaccination, and
Jenner Reconsidered, 3 INT. J. INFECT. DIS. 54 (1998). See also MICHAEL KINCH, BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR: A
HISTORY OF VACCINES AND HUMAN IMMUNITY, PEGASUS (2018)
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humans—was common knowledge at the time.42 Farmers in the area were familiar with the theory,
and at least one had tried applying it years before Jenner.43
Even the broader idea of immunization through contact with an attenuated form of a virus
had been in practice for centuries before Jenner, from medieval China to early seventeenth-century
Turkey, and probably even earlier.44
Nevertheless, Jenner’s scientific reporting of his experiments with the smallpox vaccine
set in motion a chain of events that enabled vaccine R&D to grow as a field. From the perspective
of innovation diffusion, Jenner’s reporting also laid the foundation for the first race towards largescale production of vaccines. Because Jenner’s vaccine was not patented,45 anyone with minimal
skill in the field was able to replicate it. But while proprietary rights over the vaccine itself did not
constitute a barrier to market entrance, the availability of the raw materials needed to make the
vaccine was limited. Competition thus arose in the form of a race to gather samples of vaccine
material. The first vaccine race began as a race to biological materials, and a largely unregulated
one.46
Nowhere was this more evident than in America. Unlike in Britain, there was no naturally
occurring cowpox in America.47 Doctors wishing to manufacture a vaccine had to import
samples,48 a process that increased the cost and time of making vaccines, at a time when outbreaks
were constant. As several doctors tapped into their contacts in England, one of them moved ahead
in this first vaccine race. Benjamin Waterhouse, one of the most prominent physicians of the
time,49 was able to obtain vaccine material through his friendship with a doctor and philanthropist
based in London, who sent him “thread impregnated with vaccine matter.”50 Waterhouse became
the first person to test the smallpox vaccine in America,51 and shortly thereafter the first innovator
who attempted to acquire proprietary rights over a vaccine. As one commentator has put it:

42

See Susan Brink, What’s The Real Story About The Milkmaid And The Smallpox Vaccine?, NPR (Feb.1, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/02/01/582370199/whats-the-real-story-about-the-milkmaid-andthe-smallpox-vaccine (noting that, although popular legend has it that Jenner heard of immunity conferred by
cowpox from a milkmaid, the more likely scenario is that he was familiar with inoculation experiments performed
earlier by country doctors nearby).
43

See Patrick J. Pead, Benjamin Jesty: The First Vaccinator Revealed, 9554 LANCET 2202 (2006) (describing how
Jesty immunized his family against smallpox in 1774).
44

Inoculation, the practice of removing organic matter from an infected patient and applying it subcutaneously to a
healthy patient, has been documented throughout history. See Arthur Boylston, The Origins of Inoculation, 105 J. R.
SOC. MED. 309 (2012) (describing early forms of inoculation in China and Turkey).
45

Both Britain and the colonies were at this point granting patents. Jenner did not apply for one.

46

There was no vaccine regulation at the federal level until 1902. See infra, note 61. Between 1822 and 1902, some
states attempted to regulate vaccines (minimally). See generally, JOHN DUFFY, THE SANITARIANS, University of
Illinois Press (1992).
47

ARTHUR ALLEN, VACCINE, W.W. Norton & Co (2007), at 50.

48

Id., at 50.

49

Waterhouse had co-founded Harvard Medical School in the 1780s and was generally regarded as one of the
leading physicians of the time. See Robert H. Halsey, How the President, Thomas Jefferson, and Doctor Benjamin
Waterhouse Established Vaccination as a Public Health Procedure, N.Y. (1936).
50

ALLEN, at 50.

51

Id., ib.
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Waterhouse’s first blunder would perhaps seem natural in today’s
patent-crazy biomedical community: he tried to extract generous
terms for himself from physicians in exchange for sharing the
material. In a September 1800 proposal sent to Dr. Lyman Spalding
of Portsmouth, NH, Waterhouse demanded exclusive rights to
supply the vaccine—plus a quarter of Spalding’s fees.”52
Waterhouse’s approach more closely resembles the competitive nature of today’s R&D
process than that of his time. It is the first instance of the vaccine race taking proprietary contours,
complete with a royalty-based licensing scheme. In the next section, the Article shows how a
property-centric approach to vaccine development became the hallmark of the golden age of
vaccine R&D in the 20th century. In the early 19th century, however, that approach did not last
long. After a few months, other doctors were able to have vaccine material shipped from England.53
With competition again unfettered by proprietary claims, a proto-vaccine manufacturing industry
emerged on the East Coast.54
Vaccine farms, as production units were called, operated in conditions that would be
described today as unsanitary at best.55 As vaccination became increasingly common, there were
sporadic attempts to regulate the race to produce new vaccines, which soon took place at industrial
levels. In 1812, a national Vaccine Agent was appointed,56 and the following year Congress passed
the first Vaccine Act, in an attempt to promote vaccination against smallpox.57 It took however a
major public health crisis for more comprehensive federal legislation on vaccines to be enacted.58
In 1901, fatal incidents59 linked to the use of contaminated vaccines in Saint Louis and Camden,
NJ, prompted the industry to lobby for federal legislation on vaccine manufacturing and
distribution.60 The following year, Congress passed the Act of 1902, later called the Biologics

52

Id., ib.

53

Id., ib.

54

Id., at 75.

55

See e.g. Walter Reed, What Credence Should be Given to the Statements of Those Who Claim to Furnish Vaccine
Lymph Free of Bacteria, 5 JOURNAL OF PRACTICAL MEDICINE 532, 532-34 (1985) (reporting the presence of bacteria
in samples obtained from needles used in vaccine production by six of the largest vaccine manufacturers of the
time).
56

S.L. KOTAR & J.E. GESSLER, SMALLPOX: A HISTORY, McFarland (2013) at 91.

57

“An Act to Encourage Vaccination” (Feb. 27, 1813). The 1813 Act was repealed in 1822. See generally DONALD
R. OPKINS, PRINCES AND PEASANTS: SMALLPOX IN HISTORY, University of Chicago Press (1983). In 1832, Congress
passed the Indian Vaccination Act, appropriating $12,000 to extend smallpox vaccination to Native American
populations.
58

Until the early 20th century, the states that took an interest in vaccines tended to be primarily concerned with the
legality of compulsory vaccination. See e.g. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 US 11 (1905) (upholding the authority
of the Board of Health of Cambridge, MA, to mandate vaccination during a smallpox outbreak).
59

See Ross E. DeHovitz, The 1901 St Louis Incident: The First Modern Medical Disaster, 133(6) PEDIATRICS 964
(2014). See also David E. Lilienfeld, The First Pharmacoepidemiologic Investigations: National Drug Safety Policy
in the United States, 1901-1902, 51 PERSPECT. BIOL. MED. 188 (2008).
60

See Terry S. Coleman, Early Developments in Biologics Regulation, 71 FOOD & DRUG LAW JOURNAL 544, 551
(2016) (noting the role of pharmaceutical companies in lobbying for regulation of vaccines at the federal level).
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Control Act,61 which offered a regulatory framework for vaccine manufacturing.62 This and other
laws enacted throughout the 20th century ushered in a period that is often called the golden age of
vaccine innovation—large-scale R&D in a highly competitive environment, resulting in multiple
new vaccines entering the market and greatly reducing the burden of many vaccine-preventable
diseases.
B. GOLDEN AGE AND DECLINE OF VACCINE INNOVATION
For over a century, smallpox was the only disease for which there was a vaccine in
America.63 The R&D landscape then changed significantly through the early and mid-20th century,
when additional types of vaccine technology were developed.64
The early smallpox vaccine had paved the way for live vaccines (made with a weakened
pathogen).65 Three other types of vaccines followed: toxoid vaccines (made with a toxin produced
by bacteria)66 targeting diseases like diphtheria and tetanus; inactivated vaccines (made with a
killed pathogen),67 targeting diseases like hepatitis A and the flu; and biosynthetic vaccines
(containing man-made substances)68 targeting diseases like hepatitis B and meningitis.69
The quick development of multiple new vaccines in the first half of the 20th century has led
commentators to talk about a “golden age of vaccines,” with some distinguishing between a first
golden period in the early 1900s and a second one following World War I and the Great
Depression.70 Irrespective of historical categorizations, for the purposes of this Article the relevant
facts are that there was a spur in vaccine R&D in the early to mid-20th century, as further detailed
below; that vaccine innovation occurred in the context of a highly competitive market;71 and that

61

Pub. L. No. 57-244, 32 Stat. 728 (1902) (repealed 1944). Today vaccines are largely regulated by the Public
Health Service Act, Ch. 288, 37 Stat. 309 (1912).
62

See generally Coleman, Early Developments in Biologics Regulation, supra note 60.

63

ALLEN, at 15-16.

64

See WIPO report, at 16 (listing the major types of vaccines currently under development).

65

Other examples of live vaccines include Pasteur’s rabies vaccine and the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR)
vaccine.
66

WORLD HEALTH ORG., TOXOID VACCINES, http://vaccine-safety-training.org/toxoid-vaccines.html.

67

WORLD HEALTH ORG., INACTIVATED WHOLE-CELL (KILLED ANTIGEN) VACCINES, http://vaccine-safetytraining.org/inactivated-whole-cell-vaccines.html.
68

This group includes different sub-groups of vaccines. See U.S. NAT’L. INST. HEALTH, VACCINES
(IMMUNIZATIONS) – OVERVIEW, https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/002024.htm; WORLD HEALTH ORG., SUBUNIT
VACCINES, http://vaccine-safety-training.org/subunit-vaccines.html. Some commentators address subunit,
recombinant, polysaccharide, and conjugate vaccines separately. See e.g. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, VACCINE TYPES, https://www.vaccines.gov/basics/types/index.html.
69

Today, there two additional types of vaccines, both at the experimental level (and hence not commercially
available): DNA vaccines and recombinant vector vaccines; see NAT’L. INST. HEALTH ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS
DISEASES, VACCINE TYPES, https://www.niaid.nih.gov/research/vaccine-types (last accessed June 2019).
70

OTA Report, supra note 13, at 149. The terminology is not uniform; see e.g. Isabel Delany et al., Vaccines for the
21st Century, 6 EMBO MOL. MED. 708, 708 (2014) (situating the first golden period in the early 20th century and
the second one from the 1950s onwards).
71

See Fig. 2.
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R&D translated into dozens of new vaccines entering the market over the course of a few
decades.72
In 1902—the year in which Congress enacted what would become known as the Biologics
73
Act —there were no licensed vaccine manufacturers in the U.S., and no licensed vaccines.74
Between 1903 and 1916, 38 establishments were granted a license to manufacture vaccines, and
dozens of vaccines gained regulatory approval.75 After a slight drop in the 1920s,76 vaccine R&D
and licensure rose to record numbers that remain unmatched in history: by 1940, there were 52
vaccine manufacturers, and the number of licensed vaccines commercialized in the U.S. is
estimated to have surpassed 60.77
In the 1950s and 1960s, vaccine manufacturers, both American and foreign, began exiting
the U.S. market, citing the soaring costs of obtaining regulatory approval for vaccines78 and, above
all, concerns with “unpredictable liability risks” associated with vaccine administration in the
U.S.79 This phenomenon prompted systemic market attrition, with as many as 12 manufacturers

72

See Fig. 1.

73

Infra, note 61.

74

OTA Report, supra note 13, at 149. See Figs. 1 and 2. The lack of licensed vaccines was merely a corollary of the
lack of a regulatory framework for vaccine licensure. Vaccines were nonetheless in use before that, and there was a
vaccine industry in the U.S., clustered in the Philadelphia area, as early as the late 19th century. ALLEN, supra note
XX, at 75.
75

OTA Report, ib. There are discrepancies in the number of licensed vaccines between the study conducted by the
now-defunct Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1979 and later analyses relying on more accurate data. The
official number of new “vaccine products” indicated in the OTA study for the 1903-1916 period is 367. An
authoritative 2012 study estimated that the number of “significant vaccine introductions” during this period was
actually 27. See KENDALL HOYT, LONG SHOT: VACCINES FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE, Harvard University Press (2012),
180-183. The discrepancy is likely due to inconsistencies in the recording of regulatory data by a plethora of agents
in a changing institutional environment. HOYT, at 38 (noting that “each time regulatory responsibility changed
hands, original approval dates were either lost or reentered with a more recent date, creating the false impression
that there was a spate of innovation with each transition.”)
76

Between 1916 and 1918, several European vaccine manufacturers exited the U.S. market. OTA Report, supra note
13, at 149 (noting that vaccine licensure increased for nearly a decade after the end of WWI). According to the
Report, the number of licensed vaccine manufacturers decreased from 40 to 33 between 1927 and 1931. Id.
77

The official number of new vaccines listed in the OTA Report is 607. See OTA Report, at 149. However, as noted
in note 75, this number is likely inflated. Hoyt’s 2012 study reports that there was a total of 64 new vaccine products
introduced in the U.S. market between 1903 and 1940. See HOYT, supra note 75, 180-186.
78

Interview with Dr. Stanley Plotkin, leading developer of the standard rubella vaccine, author of the leading
medical book on vaccines, and consultant to Sanofi, a large pharmaceutical company with a strong presence in the
U.S. vaccine market through its vaccine division, Sanofi-Pasteur, which is the world’s largest vaccine (noting that
“today there are fewer manufacturers of vaccines of the regulatory requirements that were added from the 60s
onwards). (Interview on file with author). See STANLEY A. PLOTKIN, M.D., NATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR INFECTIOUS
DISEASES, http://www.nfid.org/awards/plotkin.pdf. See also SANOFI-PASTEUR, OUR VACCINES,
https://www.sanofipasteur.com/en/immunization-essentials/#preventable. See also OTA Report, at 5.
79

OTA Report, at 5. See e.g. Givens v. Lederle Laboratories, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977); Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 98 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir.1968)
(collectively holding that vaccine manufacturers must warn consumers directly of the risks associated with vaccine
administration, eschewing the learned intermediary doctrine).
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quitting vaccine R&D in a single decade.80 In 1967, there were 26 manufacturers in the U.S.; in
1980, the number had decreased to 17.81
In 1986, Congress passed the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, establishing a nofault compensation program for vaccine-related injuries funded by an excise tax.82 In return,
vaccine manufacturers received broad immunity from tort-based claims for vaccine-related
injuries.83 The Act established, inter alia, that manufacturers would not be liable “in a civil action
for damages arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated with the administration of a
vaccine after October 1, 1988, if the injury or death resulted from side effects that were
unavoidable even though the vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper
directions and warnings.”84
The Act was an overt policy attempt to curb vaccine-related tort litigation and stabilize the
vaccine market.85 It failed on the second account,86 as it was unable to stop or reduce the rate of
market attrition among manufacturers. By 2003, there were four left in the U.S. market.87
60
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Figure 1: Number of Licensed Vaccine Manufacturers in the U.S.

Part II looks in greater detail at the specific characteristics of vaccine R&D, which likely
were on of the contributing causes of the manufacturer exodus even after a legal intervention

80

See F. M. Scherer, An Industrial Organization Perspective on the Influenza Vaccine Shortage, 28 MANAGERIAL &
DECISION ECONOMICS 393, 394 (2007).
81

FINANCING VACCINES, supra note 14, at 121.

82

42 U.S.C. §300aa–21-§300aa–23.

83

See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 223 (2011) (framing the Act as a quid pro quo between the pursuit of
market stability and the need to guarantee compensation for vaccine-related injuries).
84

42 U.S.C. § 300aa–22(b)(1).

85

Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, at 223 (2011) (describing the purpose of the Act as “to stabilize a vaccine market
adversely affected by an increase in vaccine-related tort litigation and to facilitate compensation to claimants who
found pursuing legitimate vaccine-inflicted injuries too costly and difficult”).
86

For a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the Act, including its other shortcoming, see Efthimios Parasidis,
Recalibrating Vaccination Laws, XX B.U. L. REV. 2153 (2018).
87

See ALLEN, VACCINE, supra note 47, at 75, (noting that by 2003 “four companies together produce[d] nearly all of
the standard childhood vaccines. Five vaccines recommended for administration in the United States during 2003
were obtained from only one producer, and most of the others had only two producers (e.g. injectable influenza
vaccine) or three sources.” See also Jon Cohen, U.S. Vaccine Supply Falls Seriously Short, SCIENCE 1998, 1998
(Mar. 15, 2002).
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designed to lessen the burden posed by tort litigation.88 But it is worthwhile to note here that, from
the perspective of R&D players,89 the phenomenon of market consolidation coincided with the end
of the golden age.90 Other parameters, like the declining number of licensed vaccines, appear to
corroborate the idea that the mechanics of vaccine innovation have changed. Consider the number
of products available to consumers: as of 2018 there are 80 licensed vaccines in the U.S., several
of which target the same disease and use the same vaccine technology.91 The rate of introduction
of vaccines targeting new diseases, or applying new vaccine technology to a given disease, has
slowed as well.92
The golden age of vaccine innovation was thus characterized by numerous companies
flocking to market in the early to mid-20th century, and the resulting introduction of important new
vaccines. 93 There are, however, additional characteristics of the vaccine race that extend beyond
the spike in the number of vaccine manufacturers, or the number of new vaccines gaining
regulatory approval.94 One of the most significant is the element of competition among vaccine
developers: no other example embodies the race-like qualities of vaccine development better than
polio R&D, which involved less-than-friendly competition between scientists using different types
of vaccine technology.95
Polio is a disease that targets primarily children, potentially leading to permanent paralysis
or death.96 It was widely feared across mid-20th-century America,97 infecting tens of thousands of
people every year.98 Against the backdrop of such a public health need for an effective vaccine,
the competition among the scientists developing the leading vaccine candidates (as well as the
institutions supporting them) has been portrayed as a war.99
88

Supra, note 79.

89

The private-sector entities involved in vaccine R&D tend to double as vaccine manufacturers. This is why the
number of vaccine manufacturers is a good proxy for vaccine innovation from an R&D perspective. The exception
to the double role of researcher/manufacturer is the public sector, which tends to be involved in the early stages of
vaccine R&D, but lacks manufacturing capacity.
90

See e.g. OTA Report, supra note 13, at 149. Using a corrected data set regarding the number of new vaccines
entering the U.S. market, Hoyt agrees that vaccine innovation declined throughout the second half of the 20th
century. See HOYT, supra note 75.
91

See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VACCINES LICENSED FOR USE IN THE UNITED STATES,
https://www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines/vaccines/approvedproducts/ucm093833.htm (data last updated Mar.
29, 2018)
92

See HISTORY OF VACCINES, TIMELINE, https://www.historyofvaccines.org/timeline.

93

Drug R&D in general experienced a boom in the mid-20th century that came to a close towards the end of the
century. See ROBERT RYDZEWSKI, REAL WORLD DRUG DISCOVERY, Elsevier (2008) at 5.
94

Infra, Part II.B.

95

Gilbert King, Salk, Sabin and the Race Against Polio, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Apr. 3, 2012) (noting that one of
the leading vaccine candidates was a killed vaccine, while the other was a live, attenuated vaccine).
96

See generally DAVID M. OSHINSKY, POLIO: AN AMERICAN STORY, Oxford University Press (2006); JANE S.
SMITH, PATENTING THE SUN, William Morrow & Co. (1990); WORLD HEALTH ORG., POLIOMYELITIS (POLIO),
http://www.who.int/topics/poliomyelitis/en/ (last accessed June 2019).
97

See generally OSHINSKY, POLIO. See also PHILIP ROTH, NEMESIS, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt (2010) (capturing
the anxiety produced by polio outbreaks in summertime).
98

King, supra note 95 (reporting between 25,000 and 50,000 annual polio cases in the 1950s, and 3,000 child deaths
in 1952 alone).
99

See generally WADMAN, supra note 30.
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Among other instances, clinical trials were performed on mentally ill children;100 the
scientist behind the winning vaccine candidate fought against randomized and blinded clinical
trials;101 competitors publicly thrashed one another over scientific reporting of polio research;102
the vaccine that first emerged from this race received regulatory approval on the same day that its
safety and efficacy was reported;103 an antiseptic was added to this vaccine without being tested;104
and one of the six licensed manufacturers did not follow the vaccine’s specifications, infecting
40,000 people with polio, and killing or injuring several children.105
In the long term, this race did lead to the near-eradication of polio at a global level.106 The
public health impact of the first commercially available was such that the scientist who invented
it, Jonas Salk, became a celebrity, and the vaccine became known as “the Salk vaccine.”107 If from
the perspective of market competition the 1940s were the high point of the golden age of vaccines,
polio R&D turned the 1950s into the apex of vaccine development as a race between opposing
parties.
This carries important ramifications from the regulatory viewpoint. Heightened
competition between vaccine developers accentuated the need for stricter regulations concerning
vaccine development, testing and manufacturing. Shortly after the polio vaccine race, and on the
heels of the thalidomide scandal,108 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) began regulating
drugs much more strictly, requiring sponsors to demonstrate the efficacy of the drug in addition to
its safety.109 From an R&D perspective, the need to generate, collect and submit more data made
drug development longer and more expensive.110
As FDA regulations became progressively stricter, and the regulatory review process as a
whole became costlier than before, and direct competition between vaccine developers in a
shrinking market brought to the forefront another key element driving vaccine innovation:
100

ALLEN, VACCINE, supra note 47, at 185.

101

Placebo-controlled trials did eventually take place. See Marcia L. Meldrum, The Salk Polio Vaccine Field Trials
of 1954, in THE OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL RESEARCH ETHICS, EZEKIAL J. EMANUEL ET AL. (EDITORS), at 6365. What we would today define as informed consent was however lacking; see ALLEN, at 161.
102

ALLEN, at 187.

103

Tara Haelle, Polio Vaccine Found “Safe And Effective” 60 Years Ago: What Would Salk Think Today?, FORBES
(Apr. 13, 2015).
104

Id.

105

This became known as the Cutter Incident, and prompted the FDA to issue more stringent vaccine regulations.
See generally PAUL A. OFFIT, THE CUTTER INCIDENT: HOW AMERICA’S FIRST POLIO VACCINE LED TO THE GROWING
VACCINE CRISIS, Yale University Press (2005).
106

Supra, note 96. See also WORLD HEALTH ORG., 10 FACTS ON POLIO ERADICATION (2017) (noting a 99%
reduction in polio rates), https://www.who.int/features/factfiles/polio/en/ (last accessed June 2019)
107

ALLEN, VACCINE, supra note 47, at 187-88.

See generally Neil Vargesson, Thalidomide-Induced Teratogenesis: History and Mechanisms, 105 BIRTH
DEFECTS RES. 140 (2015). See also Geoff Watts, Frances Oldham Kelsey, 386 LANCET 1334 (2015) (memorializing
the FDA scientist who reviewed the thalidomide application and questioned the safety of the drug).
108

109

In an attempt to guarantee higher standards for drugs in general, the Kefauver–Harris Amendments of 1962
introduced the requirement that, in addition to demonstrating safety, drug sponsors must also demonstrate efficacy
as a condition of regulatory approval, a two-pronged regime that endures to our days. See Jeremy A. Greene & Scott
H. Podolsky, Reform, Regulation, and Pharmaceuticals — The Kefauver–Harris Amendments at 50, 367 NEW ENG.
J. MED., 1481 (2012).
110

See supra, note 13.
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proprietary rights over emerging vaccine technologies, to which the Article turns in the following
section.
The golden age of vaccines was, therefore, a multi-level race that quickly turned into a
competition-centric process, crystalizing non-collaborative models of R&D as the paradigm of
vaccine development. As discussed in Part II.C, this competition-driven approach has left an
imprint in the form of siloed vaccine R&D that is still felt today.
C. “PATENTING THE SUN:” VACCINE DEVELOPMENT AND THE EMERGENCE OF PROPRIETARY
RIGHTS
On the episode of the CBS documentary See it Now broadcast on April 12, 1955, Edward
R. Murrow interviewed Jonas Salk, the developer of the first commercially available polio vaccine
in the world.111 Murrow asked: “Who owns the patent on this vaccine?” Salk answered: “Well, the
people, I would say. There is no patent.” On footage preserved on YouTube, one can still see Salk
take an infinitesimal pause and then add: “Could you patent the sun?”112
Salk’s words have become famous.113 They stand for the idea that basic science should not
be fenced in by intellectual property barriers, and that basic scientific tools should be freely
available to all.
In fact, as articulated by Salk, the idea of the impossibility of patenting the sun presciently
spells out the boundaries of eligible subject matter in biotechnology, as set by the Supreme Court
twenty-five years later, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.114 In examining the patentability of living
microorganisms, the Court observed that Congressional intent had been to craft patent subject
matter broadly, to include “anything under the sun that is made by man.”115 Patent law protects
man-made inventions, but not laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.116 Earlier
Supreme Court case law had foreshadowed this idea: in Funk Bros., the Court explicitly declared
unpatentable “the heat of the sun,” which belonged to the category of things that should remain
“free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”117
Writing for the majority in Chakrabarty, Justice Burger went on to note that patent law’s
exclusionary principle would have prevented Einstein from having any intellectual property rights
over E=mc2 or Newton, over the law of universal gravitation.118 In this sense, Jonas Salk was
correct: it is impossible to patent the sun, and it is undesirable from a policy perspective to lock-

111

See generally OSHINSKY, supra note 96.

112

Jessica Kaluza-Klein, Could You Patent the Sun?, YOUTUBE (Mar. 22, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AEH_M3O1mtM (last accessed May 2019).
113

See SMITH, supra note 97, at 13.

114

447 U.S. 303 (1980).

115

Id., at 309.

116

Id., at 303.

117

Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). The other examples mentioned by Justice
Douglas in Funk Bros. are (what today we would define as naturally occurring) bacteria, electricity and properties of
metals. Id., ib.
118

Id., ib.
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in the building blocks of scientific research. But vaccines are not akin to the sun, and Salk’s
analogy fails on every other account.119
The unpatentable element behind vaccine innovation is the idea of triggering immunity
against a specific disease, an idea that, as seen in Part I.A, preceded by centuries the invention of
the first vaccine by Edward Jenner. But a host of different components of any given vaccine, as
well as combinations thereof, are patent-eligible,120 as long as they meet the statutory requirements
of novelty, non-obviousness and usefulness. 121 Examples of these components include the main
components of a vaccine, like antigens;122 inactive or residual ingredients like stabilizers123 (e.g.
sugars); adjuvants124 to enhance immune responses (e.g. aluminum salts); manufacturing
processes;125 the delivery method and the delivery device.126
If at the time of Jenner’s vaccine proprietary claims over vaccine material (like
Waterhouse’s) stood out as aberrant, the golden age of vaccine innovation made prospective
reliance on patents the norm.127 In fact, contrary to what his statements on Murrow’s show might
imply, Jonas Salk himself had actually contemplated patenting the polio vaccine.128 Lawyers at the
National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, which funded Salk’s research, assessed the
patentability of the polio vaccine and concluded that it failed to meet the statutory requirement of
novelty.129 The John Enders lab at the Children’s Medical Center in Boston had grown poliovirus
in 1949, and Salk used their technique to develop his vaccine three years later.130 Other scientists
had made additional discoveries that Salk had openly relied on,131 and for these reasons it was
determined that “there was nothing to patent.”132

119

Salk was not the only scientist voicing his (at least theoretical) opposition to certain patents. Enrico Fermi, a
Nobel Prize-winner physicist, was known for going a step further and declaring that scientists should not have any
proprietary rights over their inventions. See generally GINO SEGRÈ & BETTINA HOERLIN, THE POPE OF PHYSICS:
ENRICO FERMI AND THE BIRTH OF THE ATOMIC AGE, Henry Holt & Co. (2016).
120

See 35 U.S.C. § 101.

121

Respectively, 35 U.S.C. § 102, § 103 and § 101.

122

Antigens are substances that induce immune responses from the body. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, VACCINES & IMMUNIZATION GLOSSARY, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/terms/glossary.html (last
accessed June 2019).
123

See e.g. Carl Burke & David Volkin, WO1999012568A1 (“Stabilizers Containing Recombinant Human Serum
Albumin for Live Virus Vaccines”).
124

See e.g. Eric M. Bonnem et al., US5679356A (“Use of GM-CSF as a Vaccine Adjuvant”).

125

See e.g. Majid Mehtali et al., CA2604330C (“Process of Manufacturing Viral Vaccines in Suspension Avian
Embryonic Derived Stem Cell Lines”).
126

See e.g. Eric James Wall, US7670314B2 (“Injection Device for Administering a Vaccine”).

127

Infra, fig. 1.

128

OSHINSKY, AMERICAN STORY, supra note 96, at 63-65.

129

SMITH, PATENTING THE SUN, supra note 96.

130

ALLEN, VACCINE, supra note 47, at 196-97.

131

That was the case, for instance, of Dorothy Horstmann at Yale. See Heather A. Carleton, Putting Together the
Pieces of Polio: How Dorothy Horstmann Helped Solve the Puzzle, 84 YALE J BIOL. MED. 83, 84-85 (2011).
132

ALLEN, at 197.
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In the 1980s and 1990s, Salk conducted R&D in the field of HIV and did not object to
patenting the results.133 A patent search reveals several HIV vaccine-related patents that were
granted to Salk and a co-inventor.134
This is not to say that inventors should not be awarded patents for meritorious contributions
to vaccine R&D.135 But it illustrates the idea that patents have permeated the ethos of vaccine
R&D. Empirical data supports the finding that this other aspect of the vaccine race—the race to
patents—started in the mid-20th century. A study by the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) has shown that the levels of patenting activity in the field of vaccines have steadily
increased from the 1960s onwards.136 The study identified 11,818 families137 of patents or patent
applications filed between the 1920s and the first decade of the 21st century,138 with most of the
filing activity (5,230 cases) concentrated in the U.S.139
WIPO analysts mined historical data from patent offices across the globe, gathering
information on 11,569 first filings of patent-related vaccine applications.140 While first filings are
an imperfect measurement of actual inventiveness—as patent applications may be abandoned,
rejected or reexamined141—they can be seen as an indicator that patents gradually become a
relevant tool in vaccine R&D strategies. For instance, in 1955, the year Salk’s polio vaccine was
approved, there were 4 first fillings globally.142 A decade later the number quintupled (20), and in
1985 it was up to 126.143 In 1998, the number of worldwide first filings went over 500, and in 2007
it surpassed the 600-mark.144 While there is no comprehensive dataset allowing us to infer a
correlation between first filings and issued patents covering vaccine technology, an increase in

133

Brian Palmer, Jonas Salk: Good at Virology, Bad at Economics, SLATE,
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/history_of_innovation/2014/04/the_real_reasons_jonas_salk_didn_t_paten
t_the_polio_vaccine.html (Apr. 13, 2014).
134

These patents were assigned to The Immune Response Corporation, which Salk co-founded. See e.g. U.S. Patent
5,256,767A (issued Oct. 26, 1993) (covering retroviral antigens, as well as methods of production and preparation).
135

The reasons behind the need for patents as an incentive mechanism in the specific field of vaccine R&D are
discussed in Part II.
136

WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., PATENT LANDSCAPE REPORT ON VACCINES FOR SELECTED INFECTIOUS DISEASES
[hereinafter WIPO Report] (2012).
137
Per WIPO terminology, a patent family is a “collection of published patent documents relating to the same
invention, or to several inventions sharing a common aspect, that are published at different times in the same
country or published in different countries or regions.” WIPO, HANDBOOK ON INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY INFORMATION
AND DOCUMENTATION: GLOSSARY OF TERMS CONCERNING I NDUSTRIAL PROPERTY INFORMATION AND
DOCUMENTATION (June 2013), at 8.1.18.
138

WIPO Report, at 16.

139

WIPO Report, at 22. Between 1921 and 2011, WIPO calculated that there were 5,230 first filings of vaccinerelated patent applications in the U.S., as opposed to 1133 in China, 942 in the United Kingdom, 632 in Japan, 625
in Russia, and 449 in France. In the developing world, Brazil led the way with 75 first filings, followed by India
with 69, and South Africa with 20.
140

WIPO Report, at 25-26. The data collected by WIPO does not include numbers from countries that do not publish
patent applications that are not granted. Id., at 20. See also infra, note 147).
141

Reexamination might lead to invalidation of the patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 321; 35 U.S.C. § 311.

142

WIPO Report, at 25. All the 1955 filings took place in the U.S.

143

Id., at 25-26.

144

Id., at 26.
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filing activity of this magnitude, and over such an extended period of time, seems to indicate that
intellectual property became a systemic component of vaccine R&D in the late 20th century.
I used the raw data provided by WIPO to produce three graphics illustrating the upward
trend in patents or patent applications covering innovation related to vaccine R&D. The first graph
maps the evolution of global145 first filings from the beginnings of the golden age of vaccine
development to the end of the 2000s.146
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Figure 1: Number of worldwide first filings (1935-2009)

The second graph focuses on patents covering vaccine technology issued in the U.S.
between 1935 and 2000. Until late November 2000, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office did not
publish patent applications.147 Therefore, the data collected by WIPO until then encompasses only
the number of vaccine-related patents granted in the U.S., but not the overall number of related
patent applications, unlike in other countries. In the graphic below, I adjusted the information
accordingly.
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A total of 57 countries reported patents or patent applications related to vaccine technology. Id., at 25-26.

146

2009 being the last year for which there is reliable data on first filings in this area. See WIPO Report, at 20
(noting that data included in the WIPO study for the post-2009 period is incomplete due to an 18-month delay in the
publication of patent applications).
147

USPTO, USPTO Will Begin Publishing Patent Applications, Press Release 00-72 (Nov. 27, 2000), available at
https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-will-begin-publishing-patent-applications (last accessed May
2019). See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b)(1)(A) (describing the publication requirement introduced by the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act).
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Figure 2: Number of Vaccine Patents Granted by the USPTO (1935-2000)

The third graph combines vaccine-related patents that issued between 1935 and 2000
period in the U.S. with vaccine-related patents and patent applications filed in the U.S. between
2000 and 2009.148
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Figure 3: Number of U.S. First Filings Involving Vaccine Technology (1935-2009)

The evolution of patent grants and patent applications in the U.S. is consistent with global
trends, with the absolute number of first filings consistently surpassing the aggregated volume of
first filings in the rest of the world. In 1955, the year of the Salk vaccine, 4 vaccine patents were
granted in the U.S. A decade later that number had quadrupled. By the mid-1970s, the Patent and
Trademark Office was issuing an average of 12 vaccine-related patents a year. In the late 1980s,
that number jumped to close to 90, and in the late 1990s it surpassed 200. From 200 onwards,
when patent applications were added to issued patents, the number rose to the mid- to high-200s.
The emergence of intellectual property rights as part of the process of vaccine R&D is in
line with the findings of literature on the role of patents in biopharmaceutical innovation.149 But
there is an additional layer that has so far remained unexplored. In the field of vaccines, the rise of
patenting activity coincides with an actual decrease in the number of vaccine approvals in the U.S.,
as well as with the market consolidation caused by the sharp reduction in the number of vaccine
manufacturers, as described in the previous section.
A comparison between these dimensions yields two initial insights. First, it suggests that it
is unlikely that there might be a correlation between patenting activity and vaccine innovation, if
we assess the latter by the number of new vaccines entering the market during a selected period of
time. And second, while it does not prove that market concentration led to more aggressive
patenting strategies, it does indicate that the shrinking number of vaccine manufacturers in the
U.S. is highly engaged in patenting the results of vaccine R&D.
There are also a few limitations to the data presented above that raise additional questions
worth further investigation. First, it is hard to discern any impact caused by the introduction of
stricter vaccine regulations by the FDA in the early 1960s. The numbers of vaccine patents issued
in the U.S. dipped the year after the regulations came into force (1963) and were not especially
high during the following decade, but no conclusions can be drawn on the strength of this data
148

WIPO Report, at 25-26.

149

See e.g. Eisenberg, infra note 152.
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alone. And second, the rise of patenting activity from the 1980s onwards coincides with the birth
and boom of the biotech industry,150 of which vaccine R&D is a sub-set. This phenomenon has
undoubtedly left an imprint on the vaccine race, which the data presented above cannot fully
capture.
Nevertheless, it is clear the race towards proprietary rights has become an important feature
of vaccine R&D. This does not mean that vaccine innovation cannot take place outside patentcentric models of R&D. As Amy Kapczynski has demonstrated, there has been sustained R&D
and considerable levels of innovation around the development of vaccines targeting the pandemic
flu.151
But the salience of intellectual property mechanisms in vaccine innovation bears further
exploring: as industry claims that patents are a sine qua non of biopharmaceutical R&D,152 what
are the consequences of a patent-based vaccine race? And if patents incentivize investment in
costly and risky areas, what made vaccine R&D so appealing during the golden age, and what
makes it a deterrent to investment today? The following section turns to these questions, examining
the vaccine R&D process in greater detail, and placing both the structural features of vaccine
markets and the role of vaccine patents into a broader context.
II. BARRIERS TO VACCINE DEVELOPMENT
Part I outlined the contours of the race to produce new vaccines. For decades, that race has
resulted in diminishing vaccine innovation. In 2015, the Foundation for Vaccine Research
compiled a list of categories of vaccine-preventable diseases for which there was no vaccine, or
only a partially effective vaccine: the final count totaled 47 categories, including diseases like
hepatitis C, HIV, universal influenza and Lyme disease. 153
As detailed in the following sections, the reasons for the current lack of much-needed
vaccines are manifold. In some cases, the problem is largely scientific: recall the examples of
cancer vaccines or a universal flu vaccine, for which there are funded R&D projects, but that seems
dependent on scientific breakthroughs that have yet to occur.154
In other cases, we lack vaccines for diseases for which promising R&D has stopped,155 or
because R&D has never taken place.156 While these are two different scenarios, they are rooted in
150

See generally SALLY SMITH HUGHES, GENENTECH: THE BEGINNINGS OF BIOTECH, University of Chicago Press
(2011).
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102 CORNELL L. REV. 1539 (2017). See also, WORLD HEALTH ORG., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PREPAREDNESS
FRAMEWORK (2011) (laying out the foundations for the sharing of flu viruses, as well as a benefit sharing regime).
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See e.g. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
345, 346-47 (2007) (noting that the biopharmaceutical industry has “sung the praises” of patents as incentives to
R&D).
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See Plotkin et al., Establishing a Global Vaccine-Development Fund, supra note 4, at 298 (noting that, for a
minority of these categories, there were vaccines in advanced R&D stages, but that most of them were not in
development).
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That was the case of Zika vaccines before the 2015-16 outbreaks. See generally Ana Santos Rutschman, IP
Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1200 (2018).
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the same problem: vaccine R&D,157 often described as an expensive and risky endeavor with
limited markets to recoup costs,158 is off-putting to funders and, by extension, ignored by (certain)
research communities. These are the cases that concern this Article from now on, as they represent
failures of legal and policy regimes aimed at promoting biopharmaceutical innovation.
Part II explores the reasons that make markets adverse to vaccine R&D. The first section
introduces this phenomenon by contrasting it with the public health need for the development of
both new and better vaccines. The following section focuses on the specific causes of failing R&D
regimes for vaccines.
A. THE VACCINE DEVELOPMENT PARADOX
Vaccines both prevent disease159 and reduce its burden.160 They are widely considered
highly cost-effective mechanisms that result in substantial savings to national health systems.161
Yet, we lack vaccines for dozens of infectious diseases, many of which are currently on the rise.162
As the first vaccine-preventable diseases were eradicated in the 20th century, vaccine
manufacturers exited the market en masse.163 With the notable exception of a few existing
vaccines, 164 the contemporary market for vaccines targeting emerging pathogens is often
considered too small to attract substantial private investment,165 and the public sector is generally
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WORLD HEALTH ORG., VACCINE MARKET,
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over the past decades” account for 80% of global vaccine sales).
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See Bourree Lam, Vaccines Are Profitable, So What?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 10, 2015) (noting that there are a few
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unable to carry vaccine R&D through the later stages of clinical development.166 The dynamics of
vaccine development are paradoxical, in that from a public health perspective they are valued
highly, but from a market perspective they tend to be considered an unattractive investment, and
thus relegated to the backburner of biopharmaceutical R&D.
Some commentators have pointed out that vaccine R&D is “not a priority for industry”
because of the unlikelihood of return on investment.167 At the same time, empirical evidence
suggests that revenue generated by vaccines has been growing steadily since the turn of the
century. In a study by PATH168 for the Global Vaccine and Immunization Research Forum, the
global vaccine market was estimated to be worth USD 6 billion in 2000; USD 17 billion in 2008;
USD 28 billion in 2011; and USD 33 billion in 2014.169 While this growth is encouraging, these
numbers should be considered in perspective: a single blockbuster (non-vaccine) drug often
generates a third or more of the overall revenue generated by vaccines. For instance, the highestgrossing drug in the world in recent years, a biologic sold under the brand name Humira, generated
USD 18.4 billion in revenue in 2017 alone.170 Rituxan, the second best-selling drug worldwide in
the same year, generated USD 9.2 billion,171 with several other biologic drugs in the USD 7-8
billion range.172
An especially problematic feature of R&D in the field of vaccines is that, even when there
is funding available for initial R&D, the so-called “valley of death” is especially pronounced. The
expression “valley of death” is commonly employed to describe the difficulty in transitioning from
the early stages of R&D to the commercialization of a new technology, particularly in the realm
of drug innovation (including vaccine innovation).173 The valley of death typically begins at the
166
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167
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accessed May 2019).
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end of preclinical R&D (research taking place before trials on human subjects begin). It
encompasses the prolonged and costly stages of clinical development of a drug or vaccine (in the
form of trials involving human subjects) and regulatory approval (submission of results and
interaction with the FDA or similar regulatory agencies).174
In practice, this translates into the unavailability of fully developed and/or approved
vaccines in situations in which preclinical R&D has occurred and has proven successful. An
example of a recent valley of death involved Ebola R&D, which produced a viable vaccine
candidate in the early 2000s.175 A successful patent application for the vaccine was filed in 2003,176
and two years later animal tests concluded, showing the vaccine candidate to be “highly
efficacious.”177 From then on, however, the institution that developed the vaccine struggled to find
a pharmaceutical company willing to start clinical development of the vaccine.178 So great was the
lack of interest—although this was the leading Ebola vaccine candidate in the world—that between
2005 and 2014 “[t]he vaccine sat on a shelf.”179 The valley of death seemingly180 came to an end
with the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014, which prompted a race among dozens of private
companies and public-private partnerships to develop different types of Ebola vaccines.181
From a public health perspective, vaccine R&D is thus often at odds with market forces:
vaccines may prevent disease from spreading, but it often takes a potentially preventable health
crisis, or decades of strain to public health systems, for vaccine R&D to attract funding and
interest.182
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difficulties in R&D and technology transfer).
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While the phenomenon of the valley of death is not exclusive to vaccine R&D,183 valleys
of death for vaccines tend to be magnified by a confluence of scientific, economic and legal or
regulatory factors, to which the Article now turns.
B. SPECIFICITIES OF VACCINE R&D
The vaccine market is often described as unprofitable.184 As noted above, the size of the
market is a fraction of the markets for other types of pharmaceuticals.185 This is due to a host of
factors, which result directly or indirectly from the unique characteristics of vaccines.
To begin with, vaccines differ from so-called conventional drugs, which are made of small
molecules that are chemically synthesized.186 Vaccines are a subset of biologics,187 a category of
large-molecule, structurally more complex drugs, made in living cells. This inherent complexity
renders biologics more difficult and substantially more expensive to manufacture than other types
of drugs.188 As a consequence, from the perspective of would-be competitors, biologics cannot
easily be replicated,189 in sharp contrast with conventional drugs, which are reasonably easy to
reverse-engineer, enabling generic competitors to produce relatively inexpensive copies.
Until very recently, the possibility of competition in the field of biologics was further
diminished by the lack of a regulatory pathway for the approval of cheaper versions of biologics,
commonly known as biosimilars.190 In 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act created an approval
183
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mechanism for generic versions of small-molecule drugs.191 But it was not until 2009, with the
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, that a regulatory pathway was created for
sponsors of biosimilars to bring applications to the FDA.192
The lack of a regulatory mechanism allowing second-comers to compete with name brand
biologics, together with structural complexity and difficulties in reverse-engineering biologics,
help explain why the market for biologics has (so far) fewer players and is more concentrated than
markets for conventional drugs. As biologics, vaccine markets are affected by these problems.
Furthermore, in addition to differing from conventional drugs, vaccines also differ from other
biologics, in ways that further shrink the number of players willing to enter the market.
One or two doses of a vaccine are often enough to generate life- or long-term immunity.
Other drugs, including some of the current best-selling biologics, require much longer courses of
treatment, generating more revenue.193 Certain vaccine markets (especially in the developing
world) present additional problems that are less significant for other drugs. Vaccines lose potency
if exposed to heat or certain temperature variations, and a cold chain needs to be maintained at all
times when vaccines are shipped to remote markets.194
As mentioned above, it is also problematic to accurately calculate the economic impact of
vaccines on health systems. There are ways to do it, although they are not uniform. For example,
the Institute of Medicine of the U.S. National Academies looks at the “protective efficacy, disease
incidence, disease outcomes, and costs associated” with the use of a given vaccine.195 Some
entities, which measure the market in terms of sales of vaccines,196 factor in monetary revenue but
do not take into account the intangible value of vaccines—elements like the number of epidemics
prevented and deaths averted.197 This enhances the vaccine development paradox, as economic
metrics may well underrepresent the public health value of vaccines, and in turn perpetuate the
image of vaccine markets as unappealing to private investment.
Another peculiarity in the field of vaccines relates to the prominent role that the military
has played in R&D from the mid-20th century onwards.198 Infectious diseases caused by pathogens
that are not endemic to the U.S. pose threats to service members deployed abroad, prompting the
military to be an important initiator of research on these pathogens, as well as a frequent co-
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developer of early-stage vaccine technology.199 Examples of successful vaccine R&D in which the
U.S. military was involved range from Yellow Fever to Zika, including a once-licensed Lyme
disease vaccine, as well as ongoing work on an HIV vaccine candidate.200 As these examples
illustrate, many of the vaccines developed by the military become of use to the U.S. civil
population.
From 1962 onwards, the U.S. military has co-developed a quarter of all licensed
vaccines. 201 However, funding for military R&D on naturally acquired infectious diseases has
sharply decreased.202 The decrease is attributable a diversion of resources towards military R&D
on bioterrorism agents,203 magnified by a recent decrease in available funding for public-sector
research in general.204
In the case of bioterrorism preparedness, vaccines play a prominent strategic role. They
have been described as the “only practical means of protection” against biological weapons,205 and
as a consequence the U.S. military has been involved in the development of vaccines targeting
agents like anthrax, the plague and smallpox.206 Nevertheless, vaccines against bioterrorism agents
do not significantly expand the size of the U.S. vaccine market: even with renewed interest in (and
funding available for) the development of medical countermeasures207 since 2001,208 national
stockpiles for this particular types of vaccine are currently insufficient to meet demand in the case
of a bioterror attack.209
These features help explain why vaccine markets present unique challenges. Taken
together with the factors surveyed in Part I–rising costs associated with regulatory review,210 and
199
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concerns with liability211–they also help explain the sharp consolidation of the market for vaccine
manufacturers in the second half of the 20th century.
To further place vaccines in context, consider the following graph depicting the number of
new drugs approved by the FDA since 2000 (with FDA approval being the threshold for market
entrance, looking at vaccine approvals versus other drugs):
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Figure 4: FDA Drug Approvals 2000-2018212

Between 2000 and 2017,213 the FDA approved 32 new vaccines. This translates into an
average of 1.8 vaccine approvals per year from 2000 onwards, although the period between 2005
and 2009 inclusive stands out as abnormally dynamic, with 19 approvals (an average of 3.8
approvals per year). The maximum number of approvals in a single year was five (2005), followed
by four (2006, 2009), and three (2007, 2008). Between 2010 and 2017, the average number of
FDA approvals dropped to one a year (eight vaccine approvals over a span of eight years), with no
more than two approvals in a single year (2010, 2012, 2014). On three occasions, no new vaccines
entered the market (2004, 2015, 2017).
While FDA approval and subsequent market entrance are not good proxies for market size,
these numbers—seen in conjunction with revenue streams214 and other data–provide yet another
insight into the relative configuration of the vaccine market in the early 21st century.
III. RETHINKING NORMATIVE APPROACHES TO FOSTER VACCINE R&D
Having surveyed both the characteristics of the vaccine race and the specificities of vaccine
R&D, the Article now focuses on the interplay between the later stages of vaccine R&D and the
legal regime that is routinely seen as the default locus for incentivizing scientific and technical
innovation—the patent system. Part III looks beyond the incentives-inducing dimension of
intellectual property to consider the detrimental effects that the existence of intellectual property
rights may at the transactional level in the context of vaccine R&D.
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A striking feature of vaccine R&D215 is that it involves relatively simple technology. For
instance, consider the case of the Zika vaccine developed during the 2015-16 outbreak:216 making
use of existing vaccine technology targeting a different pathogen in the Zika family, Army
scientists were able to develop a vaccine candidate in just a few months.217 That vaccine candidate,
at the time considered the most promising in the world, failed not due to scientific or technological
reasons, but because of dwindling interest from the private sector once the Army attempted to
transfer rights over the vaccine to a single pharmaceutical company.218 Similarly, the problems
with the Ebola vaccine candidate mentioned in Part II.A were not of scientific or technological
nature: the vaccine was created years before the severe outbreak of 2014-16, only to meet profound
lack of interest from commercial manufacturers until the outbreak occurred. Even then, the
problems that surrounded the later stages of vaccine R&D were transactional and patent-related:219
a small company, unwilling to engage in R&D, held the rights220 over the vaccine and delayed
transfer of the vaccine technology until a striking a financially advantageous deal with a large
company.221 The delay was especially problematic as streams of funding triggered by the outbreak
quickly began shrinking.222
Transactional problems in vaccine R&D also occur outside the context of outbreaks. The
following section explores a particular embodiment of transactional inefficiencies in the form of
dispersion of vaccine technology. The case study focuses on a common virus in the herpes family
for which all vaccine components currently exist—but no approved vaccine. Part III.B then makes
the case that transactional inefficiencies like the ones illustrated by the case study should be
addressed through technology-specific legal interventions. Part III.C outlines the contours of such
an intervention, in the form of a take-and-pay regime for vaccine components.
A. TECHNOLOGY FRAGMENTATION IN VACCINE R&D
As seen in Part I.B, patents have become an integral part of the ethos of vaccine races, but
are insufficient to guarantee adequate investment in vaccine R&D.
The reliance on proprietary rights as the drivers of vaccine innovation raises an additional
question: what role do they play when vaccine technology is scattered among different parties in
the market? In other words, intellectual property is often thought of as an incentives mechanism,
a conduit to stimulate R&D, but what happens when vaccine R&D actually takes place within the
framework of proprietary rights?

215

See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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As a way of exploring these questions, the Article now introduces a case that illustrates the
drawbacks of reliance on proprietary regimes in the specific scenario of vaccine R&D. The case
involves R&D on vaccines targeting cytomegalovirus (CMV), a herpesvirus that infects more than
half of adults by age 40.223 In most cases, infection by CMV is asymptomatic or results in mild
symptoms like fever or fatigue, but it can produce devastating effects and/or death on populations
with weakened immune systems, including HIV-positive populations, as well as fetuses and
newborns.224
As of mid-2018, there is no approved CMV vaccine.225 There is, however, research being
conducted in the U.S. on multiple types of vaccine candidates, 226 and different vaccine
technologies have undergone clinical trials.227 The leading expert on the field of vaccine
development has described the R&D landscape as follows:
The difficulty (…) is that to make a perfect vaccine, we need 3
elements and each of those is being developed by different entities.
If we could put together three of the elements: a gB (glycoprotein
B), a Pentamer, and pp65 [a protein], then we would have a CMV
vaccine. It’s not a simple matter to combine those things and to go
through the process of manufacturing and to make sure they are all
compatible. Getting people together and getting collaboration is the
issue. I’ve been working with the various manufacturers and am
involved in many of the projects. Sanofi (Sanofi Pasteur) is the
manufacturer that sponsored the three successful studies with the gB
candidate in Alabama, Cincinnati, and London. The problem with
gB is that the antibodies don’t last long enough, which can be solved
by using an adjuvant, and Glaxo (GlaxoSmithKline) has good
adjuvants.228
This description exemplifies a problem associated with management of goods protected by
different bundles of proprietary rights.
Scholarship on resource management drew attention early on to the problems posed by the
absence of property rights.229 In a commons, understood as an unregulated space open to all, a
“tragedy of the commons” occurs when unregulated use leads to over-depletion of resources. In
Garrett Hardin’s classic example, in a pasture open to any and all herdsmen, over-grazing will
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eventually occur.230 In cases similar to this, property rights are a tool that can be used to avert
tragic outcomes: by restricting the number of herdsmen given access to the pasture, or the number
of sheep that are allowed to graze, property helps avoiding over-depletion of resources.231
Follow-on scholarship—with a particular affinity for the economics of biomedical
research—later identified the phenomenon of the anticommons.232 In an anticommons, the
(over)use of property rights contributes to the underuse of resources.233 A tragedy happens when
“multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has an
effective privilege of use.”234
The anticommons has also been described as fragmented ownership.235 While the CMV
vaccine case study does not embody a pure example of an anticommons—and rather a scenario
involving non-cooperative firms for which transaction costs would otherwise be relatively small—
it does illustrate the phenomenon of technology fragmentation. Individual firms have rights over
three types of technology needed to produce a vaccine. Since, for the time being,236 there are no
cooperative efforts between these pharmaceutical companies, the progress of R&D on CMV is
hampered by technology fragmentation.
Patents inherently restrict use.237 That is precisely the mechanism that renders them
valuable from an incentives perspective. In some cases, however, the mechanism that is deployed
to incentivize vaccine races may induce siloed R&D that eventually brings the race to a halt
altogether. The same legal regime designed to promote innovation—through the grant of
proprietary rights—also works in ways that may constitute an explicit hurdle to collaborative forms
of vaccine R&D. The following section argues that the specificities of vaccine R&D, alongside
the public health benefits associated with vaccines, warrant the consideration of legal solutions
tailored to this specific area of biopharmaceutical innovation.
B. THE NEED FOR ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TAILORED TO VACCINE R&D
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Theorists of innovation policy prescribe a mixed incentives approach to promote
biopharmaceutical R&D.238 Some of the proposed mechanisms include prizes,239 grants240 and
R&D-related tax incentives.241
In the field of vaccines, strategies to ensure the maintenance of some levels of R&D have
been in place for a while. The most commonly used is vaccine procurement by national
governments242 and international organizations,243 which artificially builds demand for certain
vaccines. 244 From the early 2000s onwards, the formation of partnerships bringing together the
public and private sectors in an effort to bridge the valley of death in biopharmaceutical R&D
became especially prominent.245 Some of these partnerships operate specifically in the field of
vaccines. The most representative examples are Gavi, which was established in 2000 to “improve
access to new and underused vaccines” in the developing world,246 and CEPI, established in 2017
to fund vaccine R&D for infectious diseases.247
Although these organizations are making impactful contributions to some areas of vaccine
R&D,248 their contributions primarily address the incentives side of patent related-inefficiencies.
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For a general discussion of available mechanisms to incentivize innovation beyond the sphere of patent law, see
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Similarly, mechanisms like prizes, grants or tax breaks can be deployed tin different ways to
encourage investment in vaccine R&D, but they are not primarily designed to address transactional
hurdles involving the development of new vaccines. While recognizing the need for mechanisms
like public-private partnerships and a plurality of other innovation-enhancing tools, this Article
takes a different route. It argues that the unique characteristics of vaccine R&D and vaccine
markets require novel solutions in the form of tailored legal interventions to establish partly
differentiated legal regimes governing vaccine innovation, as detailed in the following sections.
As a principle, there are reasons not to endorse technology-specific reforms, especially
those resulting in the adoption of overly specialized legal regimes.249 Scholars have cautioned
against the perils of abandoning uniformity in favor of industry-specific rules, particularly in the
context of incentives theory and intellectual property.250 Concerns with industry capture and rentseeking behavior drive one line of criticism.251 Congress has on multiple occasions enacted statutes
tailored to the needs articulated by specific industries,252 and has been especially responsive to the
pharmaceutical industry.253 Moreover, it is unclear whether the adoption of industry-specific
statutes would “respond to changing circumstances” any better than existing uniform legal
regimes.254 Crafting a separate set of rules applicable to particular industries also artificially
delineates the boundaries of technology, potentially leadings to contradictory outcomes in the case
of boundary-spanning technologies.255 Finally, a move towards specialized legal regimes
applicable to particular forms of technology would entail high administrative costs and impose
steep learning curves on the judiciary,256 not to mention a massive legislative overhaul of longestablished regimes.
This Article agrees with all of these propositions. It does not suggest that vaccine
innovation—from incentives embedded in the current patent regime to provisions governing
technology transfer—should be the subject of separate legislative treatment. It does not advocate
for a comprehensive ad hoc regime regulating all aspects of vaccine development and transfer of
vaccine technology.257 Rather, it proposes individual measures, most of them requiring a certain
degree of legislative intervention, that reflect the specific conditions surrounding vaccine R&D
without changing the entire legal regime governing biotechnologies, or technical and scientific
innovation in general.
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Discussions on the drawbacks of industry-specific regimes take place at a panoramic level:
they consider the category of biotechnology as a whole as opposed to software, for instance, not
specific biotechnologies.258 Advocating for an ad hoc regime—even if only an ad hoc patent
regime—for different types of biotechnologies would run into the same types of problems outlined
above with respect to broader categories and corresponding industries. But recognizing that a
specific area of biotechnology would benefit from tailored legislative or policy interventions is a
different proposition. The following section explores how one such intervention could take place,
cognizant of the political economy wherever possible.
C. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR NARROWLY CONSTRUED “TAKE-AND-PAY” REGIMES
This proposal focuses on the transactional side of vaccine innovation, defined as transfers
of vaccine technology needed for follow-on or complementary R&D in the field of vaccines. It
considers the adoption of “take-and-pay” regimes applicable to vaccine-related technologies
covered by proprietary rights.
“Take-and-pay” regimes are often referred to as liability regimes, in a different sense from
the one used in discussions about tort-based liability arising from problems related to the
administration of a vaccine.259 In the context discussed here, liability rules are distinguishable from
property rules, as per the Calabresi-Melamed formulation.260 In general terms, a liability rule gives
a person the ability to pay an “objectively determined value” for someone else’s entitlement.261 In
this sense, liability rules are a way of overcoming the transaction costs associated with determining
the cost of the entitlement.262
The default legal regime to promote innovation grants inventors property-like rights that
cover a meritorious technical achievement.263 If someone else wishes to use technology covered
by proprietary rights, the patent holder has to agree to that use, as well as to the conditions under
258
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which such use may occur. Recall the case of the CMV vaccine:264 three components needed to
develop a working vaccine candidate are scattered among different firms. Since, for the time being,
these firms are not cooperating, any patented technology needed for vaccine R&D has to be
licensed, or ownership of the technology has to be transferred from the rights holder(s). In this
sense, our innovation system is predicated on an approach that has traits of a property regime.265
By contrast, a liability regime would treat this situation differently. Under a liability rule,
someone interested in using the technology for R&D purposes could “take” it in exchange for
“payment” for the patentee’s entitlement. The rights holder would not be able to oppose the use of
the technology—something that cuts against the customary workings of intellectual property
law—but in return he or she would be compensated for that use. Conversely, the person or
company using the technology would not be required to engage in negotiations with the rights
holder (and support other transaction costs) and would swiftly gain access to the technology upon
payment of an “objectively determined value.”266
The choice to protect entitlements through liability rules is most commonly justified by
principles of economic efficiency,267 distributive goals268 or other social justice goals,269 including
the promotion of socially desirable innovation.270 Because the current legal regime incentivizing
innovation is incapable of generating appropriate levels of R&D in the field of vaccines, and
because of the especially difficult circumstances that surround vaccine R&D, a liability regime
designed solely to cover transfers of vaccine-related technology for R&D purposes271 would be in
line with these principles. It would promote economic efficiency by lowering transaction costs
associated with bargaining. And it would pursue social justice goals by facilitating the
development of a technology that, as seen in Parts I and II, is widely accepted as welfareenhancing.272
Jerome Reichman has proposed the adoption of liability regimes at a much broader level,
in situations in which property or property-like regimes are inefficient or socially undesirable,
hindering innovation.273 Liability rules would be used much more extensively, creating a “general
purpose innovation law,” a system fueled by “off-the-rack liability rules” that follow-on innovators
could use as needed.274 The proposal stems from an overarching analysis of how intellectual
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property, in the many shapes it currently takes, may slow down or deter innovation across the
technology spectrum.275
The liability approach proposed in this Article is of much more limited scope, applying
only to vaccines given the extraordinary challenges faced by vaccine-related R&D. Because it is
technology-specific, this proposal is also less likely to affect the expectations and vested interests
of the industry potentially affected by a shift to a liability regime.
Authors like Robert Merges have explored the possibility of industry self-regulation by
“contracting into liability rules.”276 One of the ideas behind self-regulation is that the goal of
lowering transaction costs can best be achieved through self-organizing private institutions, which
are motivated to enter the field and possess greater expertise in the subject matter.277 Examples of
industry self-regulation include the creation of collection societies like ASCAP and BMI in the
field of copyright, or technology “pools” in patents.278 Patent pools are contractual arrangements
that enable rights holders to share patented technology by “commit[ing] their patents to a single
holder, who then licenses them out to the original patentees and perhaps to outsiders.”279 An
example of a patent pool in the biopharmaceutical sphere is the Medicines Patent Pool, which is
backed by the United Nations and pools technology for developing countries, with a focus on HIV,
hepatitis C and tuberculosis.280 The World Health Organization supports the view that patent pools
are a valuable policy tool to promote innovation.281 The problem with patent pools in
biotechnology is that they are seldom used.282 Unlike most of the examples surveyed in literature
on industry self-regulation, biotechnology industries do not successfully resort to pooling.283
Against this backdrop, and even though the mechanism proposed in this Article is a liability
regime for a relatively small industry, the probability that the industry would self-regulate is low,
as illustrated by the case of the CMV vaccine. Rather than waiting for self-regulation to occur, the
approach that would best further the goal of promoting socially valuable innovation would be a
legislative intervention.
Proposals that entail legislative action are always confronted with the challenges of the
political economy, which is especially fraught with competing interests in the field of
biopharmaceutical innovation. However, unlike most other areas in biotechnology, vaccine R&D
275
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is expected to be unprofitable. Consider, for instance, the stance on vaccine profitability of the
most important public-private partnerships supporting vaccine R&D, CEPI.284 CEPI’s business
model is entirely designed around the idea that the successful development of CEPI-funded
vaccines is likely to never turn a profit.285 In fact, the organization business plan explicitly states
that “[it is anticipated that vaccines developed with CEPI support will not be profitable.”286
Given the specificities of vaccine development within the larger dynamics under which the
pharmaceutical industry typically operates, and in particular the relative size of vaccine markets,
the proposal advanced in this Article disturbs the status quo as minimally as possible.
It is also possible to further narrow the scope of a vaccine-centric liability regime. For
instance, it is possible to exclude cutting-edge vaccine technologies like the ones currently used in
the development of DNA vaccines.287 Doing so would maintain the traditional framework for R&D
in areas where science is still in early or exploratory stages, while bringing established (and
consequently less valuable) technology into the “take-and-pay” model. For instance, the liability
regime could be restricted to sub-sets of vaccine technology, or be made to be disease-specific
(including infectious diseases and excluding, for example, cancer vaccines).288 It is also possible
to have a discrete list of types of vaccines that are subject to a liability regime, much in the same
way that there are already lists of eligible diseases for incentives like the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration priority review vouchers currently awarded to sponsors of approved drugs in a
limited range of areas.289
A reasonable objection to a narrowly construed liability regime as the one proposed here
is that it might produce minimal or second-rate innovation, as more recent vaccine technology
remains under a property-like regime. While this is true, consider that such an approach would
nonetheless enable access to most of the technology used today to manufacture most of the
vaccines administered across the globe.290
A final problem with crafting a liability regime is the difficulty in determining the
appropriate price for the entitlement. Proponents of liability regimes in other contexts have
suggested that this can be resolved by the establishment of a “fixed price menu.”291 Such a solution
would be particularly manageable in the context of a liability regime circumscribed to vaccines.
Instead of a fixed list of prices, the menu could take the shape of a relatively simple formula, which
would allow the parties to take into account different variables, and which could be updated and
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added to in order to reflect changes in technological development, market evaluations or general
economic climate.
CONCLUSION
The development of new vaccines has long been understood as a public health priority,
particularly in the field of infectious diseases. Vaccine R&D, however, is adversely affected by
funding and transactional problems. This Article has explored the reasons behind this
misalignment, with a focus on the role of intellectual property at the tail end of vaccine races.
While certain legal and policy interventions have historically been used to incentivize
vaccine R&D, they leave unanswered questions related to vaccine technology transfer, such as the
lack of collaborative R&D efforts in contexts of technology fragmentation. Given the particular
characteristics of vaccine R&D, the Article has argued in favor of technology-specific legal
interventions designed to facilitate innovation in this idiosyncratic field. The specific intervention
proposed here takes the form of a legislatively construed “take-and-pay” regime. This regime
would create a pathway for follow-on innovators to access and use vaccine technology covered by
proprietary rights, and hence overcome the problem of technology dispersion.
At a broader level, the Article has sought to advance the scholarly and policy debates on
normative approaches to the promotion and diffusion of innovation in different fields of
biotechnology. As emerging biotechnologies keep challenging the boundaries of existing regimes
designed to promote innovation, it is crucial that we keep refining our legal tools and analytical
frameworks to ensure the development and availability of socially desirable technologies.
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